Practical Moral Philosophy for Lawyers

Do the Reasons We Give For Doing What We Do as Lawyers Work?

Todd Andrews, the lawyer protagonist in John Barth's novel, The Floating Opera 167 (New York: Bantam, 1972), says: "I am not a philosopher, except after the fact; but I am a mean rationalizer, and once the world has forced me into a position, I can philosophize (or rationalize) like two Kants, like seven Philadelphia lawyers. Beginning with my new conclusions, I can work out first-rate premises."

(1) Did Wishman work out any "first-rate premises" for his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis? What makes a reason for an action persuasive justification of its rightness? How can we know whether Wishman has rationalized inappropriate and unethical behavior or given adequate moral justification for his treatment of Mrs. Lewis? What kind of moral principle, if any, would justify Wishman's humiliation of an honest witness during cross-examination?

(2) What does Wishman have to say about whether his reasons are persuasive? At one point Wishman talks about the way he has been "flippant" in responding to being asked "Don't you take responsibility for what a criminal you get off may do next?" And he recognizes that it would be possible to dismiss what happened with Ms. Lewis with "lofty jurisprudential arguments"? [17] Do you get the idea that Wishman is commenting, in these phrases, on the quality of the reasons he has given for what he did?

(3) What possible "reasons" might be given to justify doing what Wishman did? Consider the following:

(i) "It is not unusual for a truthful witness to appear to be lying." [173-174]

(ii) It is the duty of the prosecutor, not defense counsel, to protect a truthful Mrs. Lewis from humiliation. [173]

(iii) If a trial "tactic" is unethical it is the duty of the trial judge to proscribe and punish its use. [8] The trial judge, in the Lewis rape case, after the trial, told Wishman that he "had dealt with this woman [Mrs. Lewis] 'brilliantly.'" [18]

When does an explanation for the harm of another serve as a good reason for the harm? For example, in an extra-martial affair, it is unlikely that a plea--"I didn't initiate the relationship"--would be a good reason for the betrayal. If you get low grades in law school, a potential employer is unlikely to be impressed with the statement: "I didn't know it was going to be as hard as it turned out to be." Or, "I had better things to do." Some reasons we use to defend our actions are simply inadequate. Indeed, we call reasons that don't stand up to careful scrutiny excuses.

Note: "A satisfactory account of good reasons in any one domain of life would necessarily require a sizable book. The repertoire of good reasons could never be constructed by any one person, since it would include all good discourse about the grounds of valid discourse in any subject. . . . " [Wayne Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent 144-145 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974)]. When asked: "Don't you take responsibility for what a criminal you get off may do next?" Wishman replies: "Very little. About as much as a doctor who repairs the broken trigger finger of a killer." It is this response he identifies as "flippant." [17]

(4) What does Wishman's effort to explain his humiliation of Mrs. Lewis tell us about how ethics works?

Seymour Wishman's Reasons

Scene 1: A Lawyer Turns Reflective

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