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Practical
Moral Philosophy for Lawyers
Imagining What We Do Is a Game
Reading Assignment: "The
Gamesman," in Michael Maccoby, The Gamesman: The New Corporate
Leaders 89-108 (New York: Bantam Books, 1978) (1976); James
P. Carse, Finite and Infinite Games 3-19, 25-33 (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1986)
(1) Lawyers frequently refer to law as a "game." [See
e.g., Seymour Wishman, Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer
15 (New York: Penguin Books, 1982)]
(i) Is law a game? If so, what kind? What are the rules
of the law game? Does law consist of more than one game?
What kind of games do lawyers play?
(ii) Does the legal profession have anything like the gamesman
described by Michael Maccoby in The Gamesman (1976)?
[Maccoby, on the "gamesman"] [Positive
& negative features of the gamesman]
(iii) What moral significance, if any, lies in the use of
the game metaphor to describe one's sense of what it means
to be a lawyer, or a law student, or perhaps even life itself?
(iv) Following Carse, is lawyering a finite or infinite
game? [Note: You should sketch out carefully the basic rules
of finite and infinite games presented by Carse (pp. 3-33)
before you attempt to answer this question.] [Carse's
Definition of Finite and Infinite Games]
(2) Is legal education a game? If so, what kind of game is
it? Are there different games with different rules being played
in law school? Using Carse's conception of finite and infinite
games, is law school a finite or infinite game?
(3) Games may be serious, even lethal, but they are also
a matter of play. Erik Erikson, in his Harvard Godkin Lectures,
suggests three possible meanings for play. [Erik
Erikson, Toys and Reasons 17, 18 (1977)]. The first
meaning of play "means to test the leeway allowed by
given limits. . . . [S]urpassing mere repetition or habituation.
. . ." Play is also used in the sense of "deceptions
and pretenses, which deny rather than transcend reality. .
. ." Finally, we speak of playing a role forced upon
us by what we "consider inescapable reality." In
what sense do lawyers engage in play in the various ways described
by Erikson?
(4) Games require rules that provide a framework of reference
and meaning. To the extent that law students "must come
to understand or sense something of the logic and symmetry
of a system of rules," they often become rule-oriented
players of the law game. Stuart Scheingold
contends that the attraction of the law game lies in the "intellectual
and even aesthetic satisfaction in coming to understand the
internal logic of the system and real gratification in working
out dependable doctrines which reconcile apparent contradictions
among rules." [See Stuart Scheingold,
The Politics of Right 157 (1974)]
(4) In what sense is a lawyer's sense of professionalism
a defining of the rules (and/or nature) of the game? Is gamesmanship
in the world of games an equivalent to professionalism in
the world of lawyers?
Erik Erickson defines gamesmanship as "passion and restraint,
discipline and originality. . . . It is in gamesmanship that
man is most human in the sense of an acceptance of his adversary
as equally human: As one side enjoys an ambiguous victory
without usurpation, and clear-cut defeat without annihilation,
an equilibrium of skill and chance is maintained." [Erik
Erikson, Toys and Reason 72 (1977)]
| Commentary |
Notes
1. For still another perspective on lawyers
and games, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Playing the Game, 17 Dalhousie
L. J. 263 (1994).
2. Robert S. DeRopp, in The Master Game:
Pathways to Higher Consciousness Beyond the Drug Experience
12-13 (New York: Delta Book, 1968) offers the following
observation on the kinds of games we play:
[W]e can divide life into object games
and meta-games. Object games can be thought of as games
played for the attainment of material things, primarily
money and the objects which money can buy. Meta-games are
played for intangibles such as knowledge or the "salvation
of the soul." In our culture object games predominate.
In earlier cultures meta-games predominated. To the players
of meta-games, object games have always seemed shallow and
futile, an attitude summarizcd in the Gospel saying: "What
shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose
his own soul?" To the players of object games, meta-games
seem fuzzy and ill-defined, involving nebulous concepts
like beauty, truth or salvation. The whole human population
of the earth can be divided into two groups, meta-game players
and object-game players, the Prosperos and the Calibans.
The two have never understood one another and it is safe
to predict that they never will. They are, psychologically
speaking, different species of man and their conflicts throughout
the ages have added greatly to the sum of human misery.
The aim of the Master Game is "attainment
of full consciousness or real awakening."[19]
[T]he Master game is played entirely in the
inner world, a vast and complex territory about which men
know very little. The aim of the game is true awakening, full
development of the powers latent in man. The game can be played
only by people whose observations of themsleves and others
have led them to a certain conclusion, namely, that a man's
ordinary state of consciousness, his so-called waking state,
is not the highest level of consciousness of which he is capable.
In fact this state is so far from real awakening that it could
appropriately be called a form of somnambulism, a condition
of "waking sleep." [21]
On master games, I highly
recommend Hermann Hesse's novel, The
Glass Bead Game (New York: Henry Holt, 1990).
3. On law as play, see: Barbara Stark, The
Practice of Law as Play, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 1005 (1996).
4. On play in legal scholarship, see: J.M.
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 275 (1988).
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