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Practical
Moral Philosophy for Lawyers
A Teacher's Questions
Prelude:We gain insight through questions.
Questions matter. To be without questions is to be without curiosity
about the human condition. There are fewer questions when we
stick close to what we know, follow the conventions of practices,
do what others do (and what others will approve our doing). It
is our questions that speak to how we proceed from the world
we know most immediately to the world that lies beyond the cover
stories we tell about our lives.
Ethics is a friend to questions, to questions that slow us
down, and prompt is to reflect on what we are doing. We all have,
or should have, questions about where we are, what we do, what
it means to become a lawyer. These questions, and the way they
are pursued, play an important role in our lives as students
and lawyers (and law teachers). We are awash in answers; the
key turns on whether we have the right questions. Our questions
tell us about the kind of life we live and the life it is possible
to live.
In lawyer ethics we address all manner of questions, many
of them with no good answers. We might note that lawyers too,
in their work with clients deal with questions: what happened?
when? with what result? what documentation was created? what
did you do then? what do you want to do now? These questions
necessarily implicate the lawyer in moral discourse with the
client. [See Thomas Shaffer, The Practice of
Law as Moral Discourse, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231 (1979); Thomas
L. Shaffer & James R. Elkins, Legal Interviewing and Counseling
249-271 (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 3rd ed., 1997)]
Some students complain about the appearance of perplexing
questions. They expect teachers to have answers and are annoyed
by questions that are not answered. Law students are known for
their practical and instrumental concerns, and legal education
seems well suited in the form of a how-to-be-a-lawyer instrumentalist
pedagogy. Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman observe that:
Most legal educators are anti-intellectual about the area
of their primary professional concern: the content and method
of legal education. This anti-intellectualism is characterized
by an unwillingness to reflect on the goals of legal education,
the content of the curriculum, the methods of teaching, and the
ability of law school graduates to practice law competently. [Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics,
73 Geo. L. Rev. 875, 875 (1985) ("Making legal education
more reflective ultimately calls into question the dominant self-image
of the legal profession.")(p. 876)]
How can we begin
to address the questions we have about our profession and about
our lives as lawyers? In what sense, are your questions about
the professions directed to the moral and ethical dimension of
lawyer work? Should we begin this inquiry into lawyer ethics
by articulating the questions we have, first about ethics, and
then those about lawyers?
Is there a way
to do ethics, to learn what a lawyer needs to know to be ethical,
and learn it in a way that honors the ethics we bring with us
into law?
What obstacles
might we expect to encounter in a study of lawyer ethics? What
hinders, impedes, and obstructs our efforts to learn ethics?
What resistance do you find, in yourself and in your colleagues,
to engaging in moral discourse and holding the practices of the
legal profession up to critical scrutiny? When we encounter resistance
to ethics, thinking ethics, talking ethics, what are we to do?
How can we, knowing what we know about the rampant skepticism
about ethics, go on? How can we honor the reality of this skepticism
and insure that it does not incapacitate us?
How would you begin
a course of conversation about lawyer ethics? With what mix of
skepticism and hope should such a conversation be forged? Knowing
what you know about your colleagues and yourself, how would you
proceed? How would you direct the conversation? What "texts"
would you read? What would you say to preface the conversation,
to insure good fortune on the journey to understand ethics?
What goals might
we envision for a sustained conversation about lawyer ethics?
Can it matter in any significant way that we choose to talk about
the moral quality of the lives we live and how our moral sensibilities
are shaped and distorted by the work we do as lawyers? How does
our ethics talk shape our ethics as lawyers?
What does it mean
to be an ethical lawyer? Can a good lawyer be a good person?
Whether a person concerned about ethics (and being a good
person) can be a good lawyer is a recognized starting point for
thinking about a moral life of lawyering. One might even make
a stronger claim, that the question is the starting point
since the question is recognized by both apologist and critic
of the amoral partisan lawyer. [See, Charles
Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer
Client Relationship, 85 Yale L. J. 1060 (1976) (Argument to justify
the amoral role); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility
in a Professional System, 27 Cath. U. L. Rev. 191, 192 (1978)
("It is a singularly good thing, I think, that law students,
and even some lawyers and law professors, are questioning with
increasing frequency and intensity whether professionalism is
compatible with human decency -- asking, that is, whether one
can be a good lawyer and a good person at the same time.");
Thomas Shaffer, American Legal Ethics (New York: Matthew Bender,
1985) (Critique of the amoral, partisan role)]
What role do the
ethical rules of our profession play in being a good lawyer?
Is there a professional
morality for lawyers different and distinct from ordinary morality?
If so, how do these two moralities work? How do they conflict?
How are we to respond
to the public (or should we say political) rhetoric that holds
lawyers in disdain?
What role does
legal education play in our efforts to be good persons who are
good lawyers? What kind of moral world is law school? How is
professionalism taught in law school? How does professionalism
mold and shape a lawyer's identity? How can we know what our
ethics are and how our ethics are being shaped by what we are
asked (and consent) to do as students of law? How does legal
education prepare us to engage in moral discourse, with other
lawyers, with clients, with ourselves?
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